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MODIFICATION OF PROCEDURAL FORMALITY IN AGENCY
RULE-MAKING DETERMINATIONS: LONG ISLAND v.
UNITED STATES
Since the turn of the century a freight car shortage has existed
in the railroad industry.1 In May, 1966 Congress amended the Inter-
state Commerce Act2 granting new statutory authority to the ICC in
an effort to control the problem. Pursuant thereto, the ICC, under its
rule-making authority,' increased the per diem rental fee' for cars as
an incentive to car construction.5 The rule-making procedure adopted
by the Commission did not permit an oral hearing, the right to present
1. "A car famine prevails which brings distress in almost every section (of the
country), and in some localities amounts to a calamity." I.C.C. Annual Reports, 16
(1906). See also SENATE REPORT No. 386, 89th Cong., 1st session, 1-3 (1966). [Herein-
after cited as SEN. REP.]
2. 49 U.S.C. sect. 1 par. 14(a). Establishment by Commission of rules, etc., as
to car service.
(a) The Commission may, after hearing, on a complaint or upon its own
initiative without complaint, establish reasonable rules, regulations, and practices
with respect to car service by common carriers by railroad subject to this
chapter, including the compensation to be paid and other terms of any contract,
agreement, or arrangement for the use of any locomotive, car, or other vehicle
not owned by the carrier using it (and whether or not owned by another
carrier), and the penalties or other sanctions for nonobservance of such rules,
regulations, or practices. In fixing such compensation to be paid for the use of
any type of freight car, the Commission shall give consideration to the national
level of ownership of such type of freight car and to other factors affecting the
adequacy of the national freight car supply, and shall, on the basis of such con-
sideration, determine whether compensation should be computed solely on the
basis of elements of ownership expense involved in owning and maintaining
such type of freight car, including a fair return on value, or whether such
compensation should be increased by incentive element or elements of com-
pensation as in the Commission's judgment will provide just and reasonable com-
pensation to freight car owners, contribute to sound car service practices (in-
cluding efficient utilization and distribution of cars), and encourage the acquisi-
tion and maintenance of a car supply adequate to meet the needs of commerce
and the national defense. The Commission shall not make any incentive element
applicable to any type of freight car the supply of which the Commission finds
to be adequate and may exempt from the compensation to be paid by any group
of carriers such incentive element or elements if the Commission finds it to be
in the national interest.
The old section ended after the first full sentence. The additional authority conferred
upon the ICC was specific in what matters to consider when setting the compensation.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) : "Rule-making means agency process for formulating, amend-
ing, or repealing a rule."
4. The per diem fee is the amount one railroad pays to another for the use of its
freight cars. Higher per diem charges would serve as an incentive for railroads to invest in
the construction of freight cars and to keep the cars as long as doing so is cheaper than
renting.
5. 32 Fed. Reg. 20987, (1968).
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rebuttal evidence or the opportunity to cross-examine Commission wit-
nesses. The Long Island Railroad and eight other railroads complained
that the last sentence of § 553(c) 6 of the Administrative Procedure
Act' applied, and, therefore, the due process required was that of §
556(d) s of the A.P.A.; an oral hearing with an opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses and to offer rebuttal evidence. In Long Island R.R. v.
U.S.' the court accepted petitioners' argument that the last sentence of
§ 553(c) applied. Although the decision extended the scope of a formal
hearing to include the rule-making proceeding of the ICC which was
here involved, it modified the elements necessary to constitute a formal
hearing by concluding that the final sentence of § 556(d)"0 also applied.
Consequently, a formal hearing need not be conducted in the traditional
manner.
1
'
I
A brief examination of the Commission's history is necessary in
order to evaluate the Long Island decision. Congress created the ICC
6. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (c) reads:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.
After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incor-
porate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis
and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply
instead of this subsection.
7. Hereinafter referred to as the APA.
8. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) relevant part reads:
A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary
evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence and to conduct such cross examination
as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. In rule making
or determining claims for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses
an agency may, when a party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures
for the submission of all or part of the evidence in written form.
9. 318 F. Supp. 490 (D.C.N.Y. 1970).
10. In rule making or determining claims for money or benefits or applica-
tions for initial licenses an agency may, when a party will not be prejudiced
thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in
written form. 49 U.S.C. § 556(d).
11. The term formal hearing in the context of this paper shall mean an oral
hearing, where the affected parties shall have the opportunity to present their evidence
orally and shall be able to cross-examine witnesses. Professor Davis calls a formal
hearing, a trial type hearing, see Administrative Law Treatise § 7.01. The APA refers
to a formal hearing when rule-making or adjudication is required by statute to be made
"on the record" after opportunity for an agency hearing. A formal hearing has also been
interpreted to mean a full hearing as found in some statutes. An informal hearing allows
for all or part of the evidence to be in written form and seldom requires cross-examina-
tion.
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in 188712 to prevent the abuse of monopolistic power 3 then possessed
by the railroads and to represent the public interest in interstate trans-
portation and commerce." The adolescent years proved unfriendly to the
ICC 5 and the courts often contributed to its difficulties.16
Need for additional legislation was voiced by the Commission in
1897," and gradually since 1906 the Commission's powers have been
augmented." In 1946, however, when the ICC endeavored to cure the
car shortage by fixing compensation for the use of freight cars as a
means of promoting greater efficiency in the use and supply of cars, the
courts denied the Commission authority to require compensation for
regulatory purposes.
In Palmer v. United States the court interpreted the word "com-
pensation" in § 1-14(a)" ° to exclude compensation for regulatory
12. The Commission was created on March 4, 1887 and organized as a body on
March 31, 1887.
13. FELLMETH, R.C., THE INTERSTATE COMERCE OMISSION, 119 (1970). [Herein-
after cited as I.C.O.]
14. For a critical appraisal of how the ICC in fact represents the transportation
interests see FELLMETH, I.C.O., Id.
15. Professor Sharfman gives an appropriate summary of the first two decades of
the ICC:
...The entire period of almost two decades disclosed a basic struggle for
supremacy between the government and the railroads, a struggle which mani-
fested itself in a great variety of concrete controversies, and in the outcome of
which the carriers, the Commission, the courts, and the pressure of public
opinion and of vigorous political leadership all played important roles.
I SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMiISSiON, 39 (1931). [Hereinafter cited
as I SHARFMAN.] See also Aitchison, C., The Evolution of the Interstate Commerce
Act 5887-I937, 5 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 289 (1937).
16. Originally the Commission's orders were of no effect until passed on by the
courts and often the courts overruled the Commission. McFARLAND, CARL, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF THE FTC AND ICC, Harvard University Press, 107, (1937). The court's
had gone so far as to make the ICC a "useless" body that in ICC v. Alabama Midland
Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144, 176 (1897), a justice remarked that by judicial interpretations
the ICC ". . . has been shorn to do anything of an effective nature."
Three cases which have had a strong impact on the ICC have been ICC v. Cin-
cinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co., 167 U.S. 479 (1897), which destroyed the Commission's
belief that it had power to prescribe rates; ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227
U.S. 88 (1913), which compelled the Commission to grant a formal hearing so that the
parties would be able to "meet" all the evidence against them; and Morgan v. U.S., 298
U.S. 468 (1936), which also stressed the full hearing concept.
17. Annual Reports, 12-13 (1897). This report contains an elaborate discussion of
the impaired status of the Commission resulting from the lack of authority as judicially
interpreted and the defects originating within the statute itself.
18. The more important being: The Hepburn Act, June 29, 1906, c. 3591 § 4, 34
Stat. 589 granting rate making authority to the Commission; Esch Car Serice Act,
August 9, 1917, ch. 50, 40 Stat. 101 amending § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act
obligating carriers to establish and observe just and reasonable rules, regulations, and
practices relating to car service; and the Transportation Act of 1920, Feb. 28, 1920, c.
91, 41 Stat. 456 and the Transportation Act of .940, Sept. 18, 1940, ch. 722, 54 Stat. 898.
19. 75 F. Supp. 63 (D.C.D.C. 1947).
20. First sentence of 49 U.S.C. § 1-14(a), supra at note 2.
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purposes. Section 1-14(a) gave specific power to compensate for the use
of cars and was not co-extensive with the general power to regulate the
use of cars." The court also concluded that even if § 1-14(a) was
sufficient authority to impose compensation for regulatory purposes,
the Commission must consider the costs of car ownership and expenses
of maintenance and operation before determining an appropriate com-
pensatory and incentive price. In addition, the record before the court
was faulty and incomplete in that the Commission had not made sufficient
findings of fact to sustain its order.22
After the Palmer decision the lack of sufficient freight cars to meet
existing demands, especially during "peak" periods such as the harvest
season, continued."2 Presently, the problem persists as a result of a steady
decline in car ownership and an equally steady increase in demand. 4 In
1966, cognizant of the Palmer decision, Congress explicitly extended the
Commission's authority to deal with the problem.25
Despite the increase in authority the Commission moved slowly.
Hearings were held but the Commission decided in October, 1967, that it
lacked sufficient information upon which to establish any incentive per
diem rate. In December, 1967, the Commission commenced investigations
to gather additional data, but it was not until June, 1970, that an
21. Supra note 19, at 67.
22. Supra note 19, at 75.
23. For a discussion of the effects car shortages have had on certain segments of
the country, see Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. U.S., 300 F. Supp. 318 (D.C. Neb. 1969);
and FELLzrETH, I.C.O., supra note 13 at 274 & 275.
24. From Jan. 1, 1958 to March 1, 1969 there had been a decrease of 283,412 ser-
viceable boxcars (from 685,276 to 401,864). AssociAioN OF AmmcA RAmOADs,
YEARBOK OR RALROAD FAcTs (1969). In 1966 it was estimated that shippers were
demanding 7,500 more cars daily than the Railroads could provide. S. REP. No. 386, 89th
Cong., 1st session [hereinafter referred to as SEN. REP.].
To aid the ICC in boxcar regulation, the Association of American Railroads
provides the Commission with a weekly form which shows shortages by railroad, region,
and kind of car. However, for various reasons the Commission will not release these
figures. FELLMETH, I.C.O., supra note 13, at 276.
Generally, railroads have found it less expensive to rent cars from other lines than
to build their own: "There is nothing mysterious about the cause of the drastic decline
in the number of freight cars. The public never hears about the railroad cars being
junked; instead, railroads announce with pride their car building programs." SEN. REP.,
supra note 1, at 3. In this same report a witness for an Eastern railroad owning 30% of
the nation's cars remarked, "It takes guts, sir, to spend money on freight cars even if
you have got the money." SEN. REP., rupra note 1, at 2. It costs approximately $15,000
to build a car and about $3.00 a day to rent one.
While renting cars is a major factor in the shortage crisis, other reasons have been
suggested. See generally, FE.LMETH, I.C.O., supra note 13, at 276-9, where it is suggested
that the ICC itself and the Dept. of Defense contribute heavily by certain of their
practices.
25. The 1966 congressional grant of authority augmented § 1-14(a) by adding the
second sentence. See note 2 supra.
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increase in per diems was ordered. During this period Congress criticized
the Commission for its delay,26 and one prominent critic voiced similar
sentiments by stating that the ". . . Commission has chosen to act in a
ponderous quasi-judicial fashion, which, in the regulation of freight
car movement, it is to say that it has not acted at all."27
It was within this background that the court in Long Island con-
cluded that rule-making under § 1-14(a) must include a formal proce-
dure. Initially this meant a cumbersome and time-consuming process, but
by virtue of the last sentence of § 556(d) the court modified the require-
ments of this procedure.
II
The ICC's order increasing the per diem rental costs was an
exercise of its rule-making authority.28 When an administrative agency
so acts, the appropriate procedure is governed by § 553(c) of the
APA29 which provides two alternatives. The first is an informal proce-
dure by means of written arguments, views or evidence. The other
alternative requires that when rules are compelled by statute to be made
"on the record," after opportunity for an agency hearing, § 556 and §
557 are applicable. Section 556(d) provides:
• .. [A] party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or
26. Hearing in the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Senate Com-
mitee on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st session, serial no. 19-18 (1969) [hereinafter cited
Subcommittee]. On April 7, 1970 in public letters to Chairman Brown, Senators Magnu-
son, Hartke, and Pearson wrote in part:
The events of the past year indicate quite clearly, we think, that the situation
will continue to deteriorate unless the ICC implements without delay the
authority delegated by Public Law 89-430 concerning the revision of per diem
changes.
See, FELLMErH, I.C.O., supra note 13, at 280.
27. FELLMETH, I.C.O., supra note 13, at 284.
28. 318 F. Supp. 495 (D.C.N.Y. 1970).
"Rule-making," as defined by the APA, means an "... agency process for formulat-
ing, amending or repealing a rule." 5 U.S.C. 551 (5). "Rule" is defined as:
... the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy
or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency
and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates .... 5 U.S.C.
551(4).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission
of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency
shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis
and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply
instead of this subsection.
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documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to con-
duct such cross-examination as may be required for a full
disclosure of the facts.80
Petitioners contended that the ICC must act in accordance with
this provision of § 556(d) because of § 1-14(a) of the Interstate
Commerce Act. Section 1-14(a) does not explicitly use the wording
"on the record" as indicated in § 553(c) but requires only a "hearing."
The court, however, interpreted this to mean "on the record," and, there-
fore, regarded § 556(d) as applicable.8 It relied on the tradition and
practice of the ICC to support its conclusion that § 1-14 (a) was intended
to so provide.
Historically the Commission has demonstrated considerable concern
for procedural due process and hence has generally permitted parties
maximum procedural protection.82 Several theories can be postulated to
explain the willingness of the ICC to employ formal procedures. As one
of the first governmental regulatory agencies,83 the ICC was often
suspect, and reacted by formalizing its proceedings to gain public con-
fidence. 4 The courts encouraged this due process formalization by over-
ruling decisions that lacked due process standards.8 In addition, trial
30. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
31. See note 8 supra.
32. "The Commission . . . has meticulously refrained from summary determina-
tions, however conducive such more or less arbitrary action might seem to be, at the
moment, to the attainment of desirable results... IV SHARFMAN, supra note 15, at
254. See also, The Report on Practices and Procedures of Government Control, (letter
from the Chairman, Board of Investigation and Research) ; HOUSE DOCUMENT No. 678,
78th Cong., 2nd session (1944). FELLMTH, I.C.O., supra note 13, at 13-24 & 284 who
contends that the ICC acts as in quasijudicial nature more than it should. See also,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, MONOGRAPH OF TIIE ATTORNEY
GENERAL's COMMITTEE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, 77th Cong., Ist session, Doc. No.
10, Part II, 97-8 (1941).
33. See note 12 supra.
34. See geerally, I, IV SHARFMAN, supra, at note 15 and Aitchison, supra, at note
15. The I.C.C.'s position was unsteady during its first decade. The railroads were well
organized and influential. They carried their influence to Congress where they found
friends of private enterprise and enemies of governmental control. The Courts during
this period were often unsympathetic and openly hostile to the Commission. I SHAIFMAN,
supra note 15, at 24.
"Administrative agencies have constantly been obligated to contend with public
mistrust of their motives, their internal processes, and their competence to deal with
matters carefully and fairly.... Lacking the support of such confidence an agency is
likely to be increasingly hampered by the courts and the legislature." REPORT ON
PRACrICES AND PROCEDURES OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL, supra note 32, at 63.
35. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 227
U.S. 88 (1913), U.S. v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Co., 226 U.S. 14
(1912). The Commission has generally incorporated those procedures described in
Morgan v. U.S., 298 U.S. 468 (1936) into its processes. IV SHARFMAN, supra note 15,
at 256. See also, REPORT ON PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL,
supra note 32, at 60.
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processes are commonly associated with proceedings on the record; 36
since most of the Commissioners had legal backgrounds and thereby
generally considered their work judicial in nature, inertia and con-
venience suggested the advantage of relying upon judicial techniques
which were well-known and available."
Ignoring these possible explanations for the Commission's past
practices, the court, in Long Island, utilizes the 1937 Attorney General's
manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 8 to support its conclusion
that § 1-14(a) requires a formal rule-making procedure. Although the
manual acknowledges that nothing in the Interstate Commerce Act
requires the Commission to act "on the record", it determines that the
ICC and the courts ". . . have long assumed that.., rate making orders
must be based upon the record. ... ""
The court's primary justification for deciding that "hearing" in
§ 1-14(a) means "on the record" is its interpretation of what the 1917
Congress thought a hearing ought to be. Congress's 1966 grant of
authority was attached to a 1917 enactment,4" and the court deemed,
therefore, that the meaning of a hearing must be perceived from the 1917
Congress's point of view.4 As support, the court relies on a 1913
Supreme Court case, ICC v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co."
The Louisville case involved an ICC decision that certain class and
commodity rates were unfair, unreasonable and discriminatory. In 1913
the Commission was limited to setting aside unreasonable rates, and then
only after a statutorily required "full hearing."4 However, in declaring
36. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 7.01.
37. REPORT ON PRACTICES, supra note 32, at 60. Throughout its history the ICC:
has been profoundly influenced by the procedures and traditions of the courts.
So marked has this influence been that within the Commission's as well as
without, there is a strong inclination to regard a large part of its major work as
essentially judicial in nature. Id. at 52.
See also, FELLMETH, I.C.O., supra note 13, at 13, where the author infers that the Com-
mission still has a profinity for judicial proceedings.
38. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDuRE ACT(1937).
39. Id. at 33-34. The court, however, failed to distinguish between the different
types of rate making orders. In Long Island the ICC used rate making in a legislative
manner in order to regulate the entire rail industry in the rental of freight cars, but this
can be distinguished from a rate order as in ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227
U.S. 88 (1913) where the commission acted prospectively against one railroad in a
quasi-judicial manner.
40. The first sentence of § 1-14(a), note 2 supra.
41. Supra note 9, at 497.
42. 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
43. 49 U.S.C. § 15(1).
Commission empowered to determine and prescribe rates, classifications, etc.
Whenever, after full hearing, upon a complaint made as provided in section 13
of this title, or after full hearing under an order for investigation and hearing
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the rates unreasonable the Commission utilized evidence that was not
introduced at the hearing. The court held this practice invalid, stating:
... all parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted
or to be considered, and must be given opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence
in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way can it test the suf-
ficiency of the facts to support the findings.44
The court in Long Island concluded that this is precisely what a "hearing"
under § 1-14(a) involves in the first instance.
After agreeing with petitioners that the third sentence of § 553(c)
applied and that the ICC must therefore grant a formal hearing in
accordance with § 556(d), 5 the court stated that "[w]hat Congress
gave by that provision of the APA, it partially took away by another."4 "
The court refers to the final sentence of § 556(d) :
In rule making or determining claims for money or benefits
or application for initial licenses an agency may, when a party
will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the sub-
mission of all or part of the evidence in written form.4"
This means that though Congress ". . . determined that even when rule-
making had to be done 'on the record', the record did not always have to
be made in the traditional manner."4
The Long Island Railroad, the court concluded, was not prejudiced
by the procedure which required that in the absence of a further showing
all the evidence be in written form, and which dispensed with cross-
made by the Commission on its own initiative, either in extension of any
pending complaint or without any complaint whatever, the Commission shall be
of opinion that any individual or joint rate, fare, or charge whatsoever demand-
ed, charged, or collected by any common carrier or carriers subject to this
chapter for the transportation of persons or property, as defined in section 1 of
this title or that any individual or joint classification, regulation, or practice
whatsoever of such carrier or carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter,
is or will be unjust or unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or unduly prefer-
ential or prejudicial, or otherwise in violation of any of the provisions of this
chapter, the Commission is authorized and empowered to determine and prescribe
what would be the just and reasonable individual or joint rate, fare or charge, or
rates, fares, or charges, to be thereafter observed in such case or the maximum
or minimum, or maximum and minimum, to be charged and what individual
or joint classification, regulation, or practice is or will be just, fair, and
reasonable....
44. Louisville, supra note 42, at 93.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), supra note 8.
46. Supra note 9, at 498.
47. See note 8 supra.
48. 318 F. Supp. 498.
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examination. All the factual information gathered by the ICC as a basis
for its action was made available to the Long Island Railroad. In
addition, the railroad failed to produce a specific showing of need for
oral presentation of evidence or cross-examination, for which the Com-
mission's rules of practice provided.49
III
Employing the final sentence of § 556(d) to eliminate some of the
characteristics of a formal hearing substantially increases administrative
flexibility. If an agency is directed by statute to extend a formal hearing,
then it can determine whether the parties would be prejudiced by having
all or part of the evidence in written form and whether cross-examination
should be permitted.5" If the agency determines that a party will not be
prejudiced, then an "informal" formal procedure may be conducted.5'
The Long Island court appears to limit its holding to those proceed-
ings which are required by statute to be made "on the record." Conse-
quently, in order for the last sentence of § 556(d) to operate, permitting
written presentation of evidence, there must be a determination that §
556(d) itself applies, which in turn depends on a determination that the
statute governing the agency requires the rule to be made "on the
record", as set forth in § 553(c). This is a restrictive interpretation
because only a few agencies have rules that are to be made "on the
record."52 Although the ICC is able to achieve this status when its
statutes require only a hearing, the sole reason may be a result of the
Commission's unique history. 3 Furthermore, to confine the applica-
bility of § 556(d) to "on the record" proceedings increases the likeli-
hood of formal rule-making hearings continuing "ad nauseum. '"5 The
Long Island decision, therefore, should have rested on the principle that,
regardless of the standard imposed by the statute governing the method
of agency proceedings, e.g. hearing, full hearing, or "on the record",
49. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, Title 49 Subchapter B-Practice and Pro-
cedure § 1100-1100.247, § 1100.53 (1971).
50. The basic requirements of the final sentence of § 556 (d), supra note 8.
51. Whether a party will be prejudiced has no fixed meaning, but a finding by the
agency that an oral hearing with cross examination would serve no useful purpose and
only prolong the proceedings, might be used as a general test.
52. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-TREATISE, § 6.06. The Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act is the prime example of an agency having to act "on the record" in rule-making that
does not deal with rates.
53. See Seigal v. Atomic Energy Commission, 400 F.2d 778 (C.A.D.C. 1968)
where the court held that the formal procedure required by § 556(d) does not apply to
the AEC because the APA only required a formal hearing when the agency statute, in
addition to providing a hearing, explicitly prescribes that the hearing be made on the
record.
54. McFarland, C., Landis Report: The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness,
47 VA. L. REv. 373, 431 (1961).
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the final sentence of § 556(d) applies under the appropriate circum-
stances."
The Long Island case is an example of when formal procedures
would serve no useful purpose. The railroad had no disagreement with
the evidence presented, but only with the interpretation which the Com-
mission made concerning the facts. When the objective is to influence
interpretation of facts, rather than to dispute their accuracy, only oral or
written arguments are required. 6 Undisputed factual evidence need not
be subjected to formal hearings whereby the parties then debate the
inferences to be drawn." In NLRB v. Joclin Manufacturing Co.,"s the
court addressed itself to this issue:
... we in no way criticize the Board thus conditioning the right
to a hearing on a showing that factual issues are substantial
and material, a requirement not only proper but necessary to
prevent dilatory tactics by employees or unions.... ."
To exclude formal hearings when the factual issues are not disputed
is especially conducive to rule-making procedures. Rule-making is pro-
spective and concerned with facts that are general in nature, not limited
to the immediate parties, and facts that are useful primarily as a basis
for determining law or policy." The rule-making process involves a
consideration of economic and social factors of an industry to which the
rule will apply. When undisputed facts are utilized in a quasi-legislative
manner to make choices of law or policy, written arguments can be
55. To extend the concept of the final sentence of § 556(d) to other hearings and
even to adjudicatory proceedings is a logical step. "On the record" rule-making is
intended to be as formal as the trial type procedures of adjudication. Under the proper
circumstances the reasons for informalizing a formal rule-making procedure can be
utilized to accomplish the same result in adjudicative proceedings without prejudicing the
parties.
56. Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard in the Administrative
Process, 51 YALE L. Rxv. 1093, 1100, 1107 (1951). [Hereinafter cited as REQUIREMENT.]
57. See Anti Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Pacific Southwest Regional
Office v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 171 (C.A.D.C. 1968), where the court concluded:
Our examination of the record satisfies us that the Commission acted within its
authority in denying an evidentiary hearing as to undisputed facts which formed
the basis of appellant's claims. The disposition of appellant's claim turned not on
determination of facts by inferences to be drawn from those facts.
58. 314 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1963).
59. Id. at 632.
60. Davis, REQgUaxEmNT, supra note 56, at 1100.
... except when the truth of specific allegation of fact is in dispute, the most
efficient vehicle both for presenting and for rebutting legislative facts is
normally written and oral argument, not testimony and cross-examination.
PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 32, at 74, 201-2.
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used,6 and formal procedures are seldom necessary."
Limiting administrative flexibility to "informalizing" formal hear-
ings in rule-making determinations only, without extending the same
to adjudicative proceedings, is to ignore the possibility that not all
adjudicative proceedings need be conducted in a formalized manner.6"
Adjudicative proceedings differ from rule-making in that they customarily
involve the formulation of judgments or orders that apply to named
individuals.0 4 Adjudicative proceedings focus upon facts about specific
parties and their past activities.65 Adjudicative facts, however, need not
always be disputed.66 Thus, to require a formal hearing merely because
the function is defined as adjudicative, is to default on the issue of
whether that type of hearing is in fact necessary.
To avoid the requirements of a formal hearing in adjudicative pro-
ceedings, administrative agencies are characterizing their procedures as
rule-making." To acknowledge that under the appropiate circumstances
some of the essentials of a formal hearing can also be modified in
adjudicative proceedings would cause less prostitution of procedural
nomenclature.
To determine when "appropriate circumstances" are presented, the
final sentence of § 556(d) states that an agency ". . . may when a party
will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of
all or part of the evidence in written form."6 (Emphasis added.) Extend-
61. Davis, REQUIREmENT, pra note 56, at 1106. See also, Automotive Parts and
Accessories Association, Inc. v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (C.A.D.C. 1968); Flying Tiger
Line, Inc. v. Boyd, 244 F. Supp. 889 (D.C.D.C. 1965); Davis, ADMtINISTATIWV LAW
TREATISE §§ 6.06 and 7.01.
62. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HAv. L. REv., 263-4
(1938).
When, as here, a new policy is based upon the general characteristics of an in-
dustry, rational decision is not furthered by requiring the agency to lose itself
in an excursion into detail that too often obscures fundamental issues rather
than clarifies them.
WBEN, Inc., v. U.S., 396 F.2d 601, 618 (9th Cir. 1968).
63. The last sentence of § 556(d) applies only to rule-making but by borrowing
from the theory behind this section the Commissions and the courts will have a working
reference when determining what procedures are appropriate for adjudicatory proceed-
* ings.
64. Fuchs, Fairness and Effectiveness in Administrative Agency Organization and
Procedures, 36 IND. L. J. 1, 44 (1960).
65. Shapiro, D., The Choice of Rule-Making or Adjudication in the
Development of Adminitrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921, 924 (1965). See also
Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARv. L. REv. 259, 264-5 (1938).
66. National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. U.S., 293 F. Supp. 634 (D.C. Okl. 1968).
67 Davis, REQUIREMENT, supra note 56, at 1107, 1112.
68. Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule Making, 59 Nw. U. L.
REV. 781, 799 (1965). [hereinafter cited as AGENCY DEVELOPmENT] See generally,
Shapiro, THE CHoIcE, supra note 65.
69. 49 U.S.C. § 556(d), supra note 8.
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ing the theory of this section to modify the elements of adjudicative
hearings would not automatically eliminate all the due process of a
formal hearing, but only that which would not prejudice the parties. So
long as parties are given an opportunity to meet the evidence against
them in an appropriate fashion, they would not be prejudiced."
Recognition of the fact that due process in administrative procedure
has never been a fixed concept and will continue to vary according to the
circumstances of each case7' adds further support for extending informal
procedures into the realm of adjudicative hearings. The likelihood of
abuse is minimized by the fact that administrative agencies have an
interest in providing adequate due process: substandard procedural pro-
tection would result in loss of public confidence in that agency"2 and risk
judicial intervention in its processes.
The possibility of using the theory behind the final sentence of §
556(d) is evidenced in the case of Upjohn Co. v. Finch." Plaintiff in
adjudicative hearings was denied an oral hearing with the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine members of a panel which concluded that
certain of its products were ineffective. Upjohn insisted that the proceed-
ings were adjudicatory and required a formal procedure but the FDA
countered by saying the proceedings were rule-making and, hence, no
formal hearing was required. The court concluded that either proceeding
may be conditioned upon reasonable grounds that a genuine and sub-
stantial issue of fact was present to warrant an evidentiary hearing. 4 In
Upjohn the plaintiff was able to appraise the evidence against it and
was afforded an opportunity to submit written documents to rebutt that
evidence. The FDA found the documents insufficient to warrant an oral
hearing and cross-examination. Therefore, the court concluded that Up-
john was not prejudiced, since no amount of cross-examination would
have changed the scientific studies and data. As a practical matter, the
70. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 32, at 74, 233. See also Davis, ADMIN-
IsTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 7.02. Davis states that the opportunity to know and meet
unfavorable evidence of adjudicative facts should include rebuttal evidence, cross-
examination and argument. But if the material issues are not disputed and the parties
only desire is to persuade the Commission or to cross-examine witnesses that are
unlikely to change their opinions, it is doubtful whether these procedures would be
employed. See note 11 in Pfizer, Inc. v. Richardson, 434 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1970).
71. Fuchs, Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARv. L. REv. 259, 274, 280 (1938).
[Hereinafter cited as RULE MAKING.]
72. Fuchs, Fairness and Effectiveness in Administrative Agency Organization and
Procedures, 36 IND. L. J. 1, 29 (1960). Professor Fuchs states that ". . . the
pursuit of agency objectives cannot wisely be pushed to the length of overriding due
process; and due process cannot validly be required to the extent of paralyzing important
governmental operations."
73. 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970).
74. Id. at 954.
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court invoked the principle of the final sentence of § 556(d) : the denial
of an oral hearing and cross-examination would not prejudice the
plaintiff.
Another FDA case denying an evidentiary hearing was Pfizer,
Inc. v. Richardson.75 The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act provides for a
formal hearing but conditions it upon a showing of "reasonable grounds
therefor. 7'  The court admitted that a controversy over the efficacy of
a particular drug raised an issue of "adjudictive facts", but concluded
that there was no denial of due process in Congress directing an agency
that it need not accord a formal hearing unless the affected party demon-
strates that there is something substantial to be heard. The court empha-
sized that its conclusion in no way casts doubt upon its decision in
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v. Richardson,7 1 wherein it
permitted the FDA, by its own regulations, to condition a hearing upon
an applicant's showing that "reasonable grounds" exists, although by
statute the FDA was required to conduct some of its rule-making pro-
ceedings "on the record.""
75. 434 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1970).
76. 21 U.S.C. § 357(f) relevant part reads:
Any interested person may file with the Secretary a petition proposing the
issuance, amendment, or repeal of any regulation contemplated by this section.
The petition shall set forth the proposal in general terms and shall state reason-
able grounds therefor. The Secretary shall give public notice of the proposal
and an opportunity for all interested persons to present their views thereon,
orally or in writing, and as soon as practicable thereafter shall make public his
action upon such proposal. At any time prior to the thirtieth day after such
action is made public any interested person may file objections to such action,
specifying with particularity the changes desired, stating reasonable grounds
therefor, and requesting a public hearing upon objections. (Emphasis
added.)
77. 318 F. Supp. 301 (D.C. Del. 1970).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (e):
If the Secretary finds, after due notice to the applicant and giving him an
opportunity for a hearing, that (1) the investigations, reports of which are
required to be submitted to the Secretary pursuant to subsection (b) of this
section, do not include adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to
show whether or not such drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof; (2) the results
of such tests show that such drug is unsafe for use under such conditions or do
not show that such drug is safe for use under such conditions; (3) the methods
used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and
packing of such drug are inadequate to preserve its identity, strength, quality,
and purity; or (4) upon the basis of the information submitted to him as part
of the application, or upon the basis of any other information before him with
respect to such drug, he has insufficient information to determine whether such
drug is safe for use under such conditions, he shall, prior to the effective date
of the application, issue an order refusing to permit the application to become
effective.
The effectiveness of an application with respect to any drug shall, after due
notice and opportunity for hearing to the applicant, by order of the Secretary
RULE-MAKING DETERMINATION
The Upjohn, Pfizer and Pharmaceutical opinions have continued
the trend of permitting greater discretion in administrative procedures. "
The emphasis is to extend only those parts of a hearing that are necessary
for parties to appropriately meet the evidence against them without
prejudicing their cause. If an oral hearing or other elements of a formal
procedure would provide no benefit, modification of that procedure is a
proper way of insuring greater efficiency in administrative proceedings.
The Long Island decision, restricting the application of the final
sentence of § 556(d) to rule-making that is required to be "on the
record", would hamper agency efforts to substitute written for oral
evidence in formal proceedings, whether rule-making or adjudicatory.
The theory behind the last sentence of § 556(d) should be used to
modify, when the conditions warrant, existing statutes that require
formal procedures. Professor Davis considers the sole guide of admin-
istrative due process as a ". . . practical one of choosing whatever means
will be most efficient in providing to the agency the desired understand-
ing while at the same time safeguarding private interests."8 The principle
be suspended if the Secretary finds (1) that clinical experience, tests by new
methods, or tests by methods not deemed reasonably applicable when such
application became effective show that such drug is unsafe for use under the
conditions of use upon the basis of which the application became effective, or,
(2) that the application contains any untrue statement of a material fact. The
order shall state the findings upon which it is based.
79. The Pharmaceutical decision follows the trend, beginning with U.S. v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1955) (see also Federal Commission v. Texaco, 377
U.S. 33, 39 (1964)) that have demonstrated a tendency to allow greater discretion in
administrative procedures. In Storer the Court upheld a FCC decision to deny a hear-
ing to a party because it failed to comply with statutory standards. Administrative dis-
cretion has been extended to deny a hearing to those who violate the agency rules on
their face. Total Telecable, Inc. v. FCC 411 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1969). Other decisions
have distinguished the word "hearing" from the words "on the record," thereby per-
mitting informal procedures. Siegal v. Atomic Energy Commission, 400 F.2d 778, 785
(C.A.D.C. 1968). Still others have permitted a more relaxed procedure when the rule-
making order is a general directive, Airlines Pilots Assoc., International v. Quesda, 276
F.2d 892 (C.A.D.C. 1960), or when an adjudicative hearing would only prolong a pro-
ceeding without gaining additional relevant information. WBEN, Inc. v. U.S., 396 F.2d
601 (2d Cir. 1968).
A recent decision by the Federal Power Commission, Ashland Oil and Refining Co.,
27 Ad. L.2d 654 (1970) applied §556(d) to a rule-making proceeding where the statute
required a full hearing, thus overcoming the limitation of Friendly's decision of per-
mitting the section to apply only when rules are required to be made "on the record." The
arguments advance by the FPC in allowing for an informal procedure are similar to
those previously mentioned: the rule-maling was of general applicability, there was no
showing of substantial controversy concerning the facts and the parties did not demon-
strate the value of oral presentation or cross-examination. Id. at 659.
80. Davis, REQUIEMENTS, supra note 63, at 1107. "Like the constitution, old
statutes take on new meaning by reason of new facts, including such legal facts as the
existence of the APA." Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making,
59 Nw. U. L. REv. 781, 799 (1965).
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behind the last sentence of § 556 (d) should be utilized to this end.
DAVID S. SIDOR
